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ABSTRACT: The article is dedicated to the problem of musical meaning and its role in contemporary 
musicological and semiotic research and reflection on music and musical culture. Nowadays, semiot­
ics of music became semiotics of becoming rather then semiotics of being, as it was earlier during the 
period of structuralism. What became the important is that the category of aisthesis is emphasized as 
well as the question of the experience, the aesthetic dimension of that experience and the subject itself. 
It is interesting to evaluate the postmodern thought as well, taking the question of its positive vs nega­
tive virtues, and — as a result — do not treat the postmodernism in negative way only (the aesthetic 
and the cognitive value of the sublime).
To see the current changes of musicology one can speak not only about its relative autonomy and how 
to understand the limits of the discipline but also how to redefine the scope and core of musicology by 
treating to find more unconventional, closely ethic, perspectives and approaches (means: imagination, 
freedom of thought, openness to alternatives and to praise the uncertainty). If the musicology could 
be ready and able to join some efforts from other humanities: semiotics, history of arts, anthropology 
and cultural studies, the thesis of the musicology as a meta-theory of musical meaning could be valid.
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ethic
1.
In the search for a mathesis universalis, it is not only musicology that 
has achieved but modest results. As the inner dynamic of our discipline shows, we 
find it easier to stick to traditional, strongly-rooted methods than to venture forth 
into the unknown and risk losing our sense of security in clashes with new points of 
view. In this respect, semiotics is and is not an exception. This ostensible contradic­
tion can be explained by means of two theses: firstly, of all the humanities, semiotics, 
as the theory of meaning, is the most capable of self-reflection, which fuels its con­
stant flux. This capacity keeps semiotics in a state of creative tension and prevents 
it from hiding behind the thesis — correct, as it happens — of the specificity of the 
object of research, namely music, as musicologists unattuned to the turbulence in 
the humanities willingly do. Of particular interest today might appear to be those 
points of contact between musicology and semiotics which result from the premise 
that musicology is centred on interpretation (we have no certainty as to its cognitive
limits and consequences, particularly on the side of the receiver), whereas semiotics 
is centred on experience understood as the “coming out of meaning”.
Secondly, drawing on an idea of Pavel Florensky’s, we will say that semiotics, 
which gives rise to aesthetics and to all axiological reflection, takes its strength from 
the idea of the original sin.1 And that is what makes semiotics today particularly sen­
sitive to experience and experimentation, those cognitive adventures of man which 
engender the most enigmatic meanings, including in art and its interpretation.
The Garden of Eden was a “commune of persons”, based on unity and direct 
experience, precluding dualism, and so signless. The fall of man is, among other 
things, a fall into semiotics. It is the serpent that leads Eve into semiotics, who 
gives the first historical lesson in signs. He reveals the principle of all semioticity: 
binary opposition. In separating the upper from the lower waters on the second 
day of creation, God created Binarius, “two”, the symbol of Satan. When the two 
becomes independent, confusion arises. Two has a female character and so the 
devil first tempts the woman. In the Book of Genesis (3:6), we read: “So when the 
woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, 
and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, 
and ate (...)’; reference here to three functions, one of which is aesthetic: “delight 
to the eyes” (alongside the material, “the tree was good for food”, and the cognitive, 
“to make one wise”).2 Original aisthesis and the first semiotic relationship: that is 
the context to which semiotics is currently returning after an age away.
2.
Putting forward, even going so far as to adopt the thesis that m u s i ­
c o l o g y  is a m e t a - t h e o r y  o f  mu s i c a l  m e a n i n g ,  adds strength to 
that voice within the space of the humanities which harmonises with the funda­
mental premises of the debate on the axiological heritage of postmodernism. The 
questions and the answers are as follows: Firstly, has postmodernism, as a shrill 
diagnosis of a century of crisis in Western culture (counting from approximately 
1860/1870), left as its legacy any axiological category worth discussing today? Yes
-  the sublime. Secondly, has postmodernism done nothing but harm to philosophi­
cal thought, or has it not? No. It has brought an awareness of the need for Sense, 
for Meaning, and thus for Value, to a degree greater than before. Postmodernism’s 
balance sheet is not purely negative.
The arrival and the “explosion” of postmodernist thought were not only a re­
action to the existing paradigms, with science and its pan-technicisation in the
1 Pavel Florensky, Ikonostas i inne szkice [Iconostasis] (Warszawa: PAX, 1991).
The Book o f Genesis (accessed June 29, 2014, www.vatican.va/...genesis/../bible eene- 
sis_en.html), chapter 3 (3:6).
forefront, disintegrating under the weight of the experience of the Holocaust. 
Dispensing with metaphysical problematic both in practice and in reflective think­
ing, “forced” even Martin Heidegger to utter in 1966 (in an interview given to “Der 
Spiegel” on 23 September of that year) words which we would not have previously 
expected from the author of Being and Time. Heidegger said: “Philosophy will be 
unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the world. This is 
true not only of philosophy but of all purely human reflection and endeavor.[...] 
The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare 
a readiness for the appearance of the god [...] insofar as in view of the absent god we 
are in a state of decline [...]” .3 Let us recall, however, that as far back as thirty one 
years earlier Edmund Husserl (Praha 1935) expressed concern over the spreading 
crisis of West European culture and civilisation, attempting to turn phenomenology 
into the point of reference for the burning need of renewing the state of Europe, 
Mankind and the humanities. Europe had to wait another thirteen years, until 1979, 
for the appearance of Jean-Franęois Lyotard’s postmodernist manifesto, which 
put a line through the cultural and civilisational heritage of the Enlightenment 
by declaring the end of Grand Narratives, including Science and its achievements 
(the atomic bomb and gas chambers). However, this excess was an integral part of 
the postmodern worldview, while the definitive battle with the Western European 
heritage of “powerful thinking” turned postmodernism into the common enemhy of 
traditional philosophy and criticism. An assessment of postmodernism must take 
into account the fact that even that most destructive of worldviews which happened 
to the twentieth century can be credibly justificatied by the transformations in the 
thinking and the values of the period in which it functioned.
As has been noted by Steven Connor, the final phase of the postmodernist 
movement, which he describes as the phase of popularisation (I would prefer to 
describe that phase as one of deeper self-reflection), which falls to the mid-1990s, 
evokes debate on the possible positive results of the postmodernist rebellion4. It 
seems to be a most interesting stage both for postmodernism itself, an assessment 
of its achievements, and for revealing those elements in it which might contribute 
to the grounding of a number of problems, questions and values directed towards 
traditional sources, but posed not in the old, now anachronistic form, but in a form 
that has been radically experienced and thought through. What is of interest is that 
the matter primarily concerns ethics, but also such concepts as “hope” (Richard 
Rorty vs Frederic Jameson), or sensitivity. I bring these concepts to mind not 
because they exhaust the set of categories of positive late- or post-postmodern 
thinking. I bring them to mind because, for me, they constitute a significant base 
for one’s own way of understanding humanities and musicology. If Jan Patocka
3 Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us”: The Spiegel Interview (1966) accessed 
December 14, 2014, http://www.ditext.com/heidegger/interview.html.
4 Steven Connor, Introduction, in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernizm (Camb­
ridge 2004), 4,15.
was right in describing modernity as a “culture of insensitivity’5, then Richard 
Rorty’s essay, to which I refer and from which I draw a number of premises for 
the postmodernist context of the debate on one of the possible dimensions of 
musicology, constitutes an important element in discovering the positive aspect 
of the vivisection of postmodernism and its values.
In a text from 1991, significantly titled Ethics o f principles and ethics o f sen­
sitivity, Rorty, sometimes alleged to be linked to postmodernism, in taking up 
deliberations on the idea of committed humanities, directed towards literature, 
recalled the figure of Socrates.6 Rorty’s Socrates, who appears here as a symbolic 
character, is pathologically uncertain, asking questions without expecting definitive 
answers. He is by way of being a “literary critic”, who favours art and not science as 
the central element of culture. His task as a teacher consists in spreading unease 
and doubt, and pointing to those books which will ensure that the desired unease 
will take on even more complex forms.7 The postmodern critic of postmodernism 
adds to the semantic field with the figure of Socrates at its centre such categories 
and concepts among which an “ironist” can move freely: sensitivity, imagination, 
freedom of thought, openness to alternatives and uncertainty.
Rorty, who was seeking a new impetus for the humanities and philosophy in 
the intensity of their contacts with literature, unwittingly came close to the views 
of Leszek Nowak, a Polish philosopher, who had spoken of the need to strengthen 
these ties, which would be beneficial to both sides. This open, inviting tone of two 
sensitive philosophers representing such diverse worldviews, results from the as­
sumption that it is not only science but also art which provides us with a credible 
picture of the world and mankind. Admittedly, it does so in a different manner, but 
variety, dialogue, or even conflict, are naturally part of that attitude. This kind of 
turning to ethics and literature provides, to a degree, evidence for the intensifying 
diktat of the natural sciences. Their radical empiricism and reductionism place 
art and the products of human cultural endeavour in the position of objects the 
origin and ontological status of which are fully determined by evolution. However, 
recognition and acceptance of these achievements cannot constitute support for 
the judgment that science is always right and that philosophy is always wrong. The 
principle of “consilience” (Edward O. Wilson), postulated in scientific methodol­
ogy, may serve both sides of the argument, but on the condition that we do away 
with the diktat of any point of view, that we allow them to function in support of 
a better understanding of the processes which surround us, and thus the criteria 
of value which lie at the foundation of our activities — in science, in the life of the 
community, and in art.
5 Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, Duchy Europy, [Esprits d’Europe (Paris: Calmann — Levy, 
2005)] trans. Jan Maria Kłoczowski (Sejny: Meridian, 2012), 171-6.
6 Richard Rorty, “Etyka zasad a etyka wrażliwości” [Ethics o f Principles and Ethics o f Sens­
itivity], Teksty Drugie 1/2 (2002), 52.
7 Ibid., 51.
In constructing the basic theses of musicology founded on Rorty’s principles 
within the framework of the ethics of sensitivity, as well as the position awarded 
to the category of meaning within that order, I make use of the methodological 
proposals put forward by Ewa Domańska. In her conception of “unconventional 
history” she proposes confronting the concepts which characterise that idea with 
those which, according to the author, belong to “academic, conventional history.” 
This confrontation can be summarised as follows:
• epistemology vs ethics and aesthetics, the problematics of ethics and aesthet­
ics, the mutual reductions and dependencies between them, also in shaping 
our attitude to the subject, dominate over the cognitive function of science; 
conventionality vs values, a return to, and placing at the centre, of the problem­
atics of axiology, in view of the critical potential in the post-postmodern discus­
sion, exceeds the role of that which is conventional and axiomatic in science;
• description vs representation, postmodernism came to regard the category of 
representation as compromised; we return to it today, but asking new ques­
tions about the subject and the rules of representation;
objectivism vs subjectivism, the radicalism of subject-centred attitudes is 
worthy of deeper interpretation, as is indicated not only by such radical con­
ceptions as that of Andrzej Falkiewicz, but also, for example, that of Charles 
Taylor with his strong ethical motivation;
cause-effect relationship us disturbing this relationship, metaphorical think­
ing, the increasing importance of metaphor when one admits as justified the 
thesis that not only science but also art provides a credible picture of the world; 
truth vs sincerity, sincerity becomes a counter-figure to truth according to the 
premise that truth is an instrument of compulsion in every form of its exist­
ence, from physical to symbolic;
• linear time vs gaps, fragments, the fragment as one of the central categories of 
postmodernism gains in value, although questions about the “Whole” continue 
to be asked, and the discourse conducted around that dilemma focuses also on 
the two issues presented below, i.e., the tension between realism (narration) 
and factualism and the critical and subject-committed stance of the sensitive 
humanities, which finds its expression in the multiplicity of equally valid styles; 
fetish of fact and origin vs criticism;
realistic narrative style vs experimenting with various styles.8 
One of the themes which link many of the scholars mentioned here is the role 
of the turning to ethics in humanistic research which focuses as in a lens the ma­
jority of the parameters of “unconventional history” quoted earlier. “Ethical criti­
cism — as I wrote elsewhere — is built on a foundation which is in equal measure 
controversial and inspiring, [...], on the continuity which exists between reading
8 Ewa Domańska, Historie niekonwencjonalne [Unconventional Histories] (Poznań: Wy­
dawnictwo Poznańskie, 2006), 78.
and life, between a book or music and the tangle of thoughts and attitudes which 
they evoke. The existence of a close relationship between a work of art (reading 
in order to live — says Martha Nussbaum) and the experience of it can lead to 
a search for heterogenic references, often complex and unforeseen either by the 
recipient or the communicative intention of the work itself; such references may 
serve to enrich the recipients” condition, increase empathy and mutuality in their 
lives, create various interactions in the Interhuman space, as well as stimulating 
the adoption of attitudes towards other areas of art and, in the wider perspective, 
a spontaneous development of critical culture”.9 This deeply humanistic tone of 
ethical criticism is becoming increasingly apparent in the voices of some musicolo­
gists. Julian Johnson in “Who Needs Classical Music?” (2002) sketches a picture 
of music as a means of strengthening authentic subjectivity, an ethical affirmation 
of what is deeply human in us. Music serves to “redeem”, and Lawrence Kramer 
follows a similar thread in his “Why Classical Music Still Matters” (2007).
3.
Semiotics today is rightly considered to have inherited from structural­
ism a negative attitude towards the question of the subject, the person. The opinion 
that contemporary semiotics is the semiotics of becoming, rather than being, is 
symptomatic of a shift in orientation. It is connected with the view of the proces- 
sive nature of the subject itself and emphasises the value of dynamic objects in 
the production of semioses (we will say, by way of example, that the work of art is 
reality in motion). The interpretation of music has also formed a certain type of 
theoretical thinking according to which musical discourse possesses subject-like 
properties, in the sense in which an aspiration to achieving particular states mani­
fests itself in musical process. For Scott Burnham, this way of thinking originates in 
the reception tradition of the “heroic” style of Beethoven’s music. A  concentration 
on the subject as the chief actor in meaning- and world-making processes (Nelson 
Goodman) allows us to number among the growing interests of semiotics “experi­
ence” (of every kind, not just empirical), “passion”, “sensitivity”, “sensuality” and
— importantly — such notions of language which accentuate its role not so much 
in the representation, as in the creation of reality (possible worlds').
Enquiring what kind of motion, becoming or dynamic is at issue in this para­
digm, let us remind ourselves of the second part of Heinrich Heine’s definition of 
music. In his “Letters on the French Stage” (1837), Heine says: “Music is a strange
9 Maciej Jabłoński, “O czym nie można mówić, o tym trzeba mówić z wnętrza. Niepewna 
myśl muzykologa z powodu “Obrony żarliwości” Adama Zagajewskiego” [Whereof one can not 
speak, thereof one must speak from ones inner life. Musicologist’s uncertain thought derived 
from “Fervour Defence” by Adam Zagajewski], Res Facta Nova 9 (18) (2007), 188.
thing. I would almost say it is a miracle’; but poet also declares: “for it stands 
half-way between thought and phenomenon, between spirit and matter, a sort 
of nebulous mediator, like and unlike each of the things it mediates — spirit that 
requires manifestation in time, and matter that can do without space”.10 This 
formulation reveals to us the fundamental weight of the matter. Music emerges 
time after time from the space of “transition” — the borderline world between 
the movement of the “day” and the meditation of the “night”, between thought 
and word, pre-sign and sign. It is eternal motion, an endless “inter” between 
inspiration and objectivity, like the journey it befalls man to make through life. 
Plato uses (e.g. in Republic) the term metaxu, for being “between”, between our 
earth, our familiar, concrete, material environment, and transcendence or mys­
tery. Metaxu defines the situation of man, who being in constant motion betrays 
one of the sides. We are dealing here not only with experience in the sense of the 
traditional philosophical category, which is a conscious act of the direct or indi­
rect apprehension of some object, but with the experiencing of transcendence or 
instability, experience that is not certain of its object. In this last case, semioticity 
is identical to the content given it by Julia Kristeva. In her opinion, “the semiotic” 
is a representation of urges and the body, referring in equal measure, never apart, 
to both sense and sensuality, sign and senses; for Eero Tarasti, ‘“the semiotic” is 
the “khora”, the prelinguistic realm of gestures, rhythms, intonations and kinetic 
energy”. Kristeva develops this idea, inverting Descartes’s proud words. Ego af- 
fectus est, non contractus: I am affect, not restriction (non contractus). We are 
to be unstable in our openness. The only possibility is raptus — rapture, a wholly 
unjustified leap from one state to another, a leap to which we are prompted not 
only by religious experience, but also by music.
The semiotics of passion, thoroughly subject-centred, engages aesthetics and 
ethics, and also, in the narrative layer, a non-realistic or even anti-realistic type of 
strongly committed narration. The consequences of these paradigmatic changes 
also concern, to an increasing extent, musicology, which, besides many other ques­
tions, has to consider the problem of experience in all its subtle riches, certainly not 
reduced merely to the laws of perception and to conclusions arising from consid­
erations and research within the framework of the “biomusicology paradigm”. The 
discussion of the figures of subjectivity proposed by Carolyn Abbate, Karol Berger 
and Aaron Ridley, rejecting ontology in favour of aesthetics, that is, performance 
and its experiencing, is an interesting example of our discipline’s interest in this 
area. The question of the immediacy of the experiencing of music and its discursive 
fruits is not the exclusive dilemma of postmodern thinkers; it was discussed in 
the 1920s by Charles Seeger, fully aware of the gulf that was developing between 
the experiencing of music and the verbalisation of that experience. The American
10 Heinrich Heine, The Miracle o f Music (accessed June 29, 2014, ratiocinative.wordpress. 
com/2013/07/20/the-miracle-of-music-heinrich-heine/).
musicologist unswervingly maintained that musical knowledge, arising through 
the process of the cultivation of music, of our intimate and intuitive contact with 
it, can never be satisfactorily translated into knowledge about music, which helps 
to form the foundations of the discipline that is musicology.
In putting forward a hypothesis according to which we may regard musicology 
as a metatheory of musical meaning, I have in mind the following issues:
firstly, defining the position of musicology within the humanities today is still 
an ongoing task;
• secondly, the range, aims and methods of the humanistic disciplines need to be 
made more precise on the basis of the dualism: naturalism — antinaturalism, 
with the problematic of musical meaning belonging to both these boundary 
perspectives, as well as being absorbed to varying degrees by intermediate 
approaches;
• thirdly, a significant element co-defining the premises specified above is the 
problem of the linguistic expression of the given experience of music enriched 
by the ethical, subject-centred and metaphysical dimension of the experience 
and how it is captured by language;
fourthly, the attitude which I describe as sensitive musicology creates the pos­
sibility of a positive approach to the issues specified here and, as a consequence, 
concentrating on the meaning of “meaning” as a semiotic category, which 
enters into relationships with such areas as phenomenology or metaphysics 
(philosophia perennis). In the debates about the legacy of postmodernism, 
concepts such as metaphysical meaning, humanities for wisdom, the Presence 
or, on the other side — new romanticism as a dramatic return to the discussion 
about the shape of the “subject,” seem to bring an interesting contribution to 
the discussion about the philosophical potential of contemporary musicology 
and music semiotics.
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